Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption: Can the States Adopt Aspects of Germany\u27s Health Care System to Achieve Universal Access and Cost Containment by Done, Byron
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 18
Number 4 Summer 1995 Article 6
1-1-1995
Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption: Can
the States Adopt Aspects of Germany's Health Care
System to Achieve Universal Access and Cost
Containment
Byron Done
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Byron Done, Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption: Can the States Adopt Aspects of Germany's Health Care System to Achieve
Universal Access and Cost Containment, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 745 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol18/iss4/6
Health Care Reform and ERISA
Preemption: Can the States Adopt
Aspects of Germany's Health Care
System to Achieve Universal Access and
Cost Containment?
By BYRON DONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The American health care system is in critical condition. More
than thirty-seven million Americans have no health insurance and
many more are inadequately insured.1 The cost of health care in the
United States is rising far faster than the nation's overall economic
growth.2 In 1994 Congress failed to enact national health care reform
legislation and the current political climate in the nation's capitol
makes it unlikely that any comprehensive reform will soon occur.3
Rather, Congress is likely to attempt only incremental, piecemeal re-
form to appease cries of inequity in the current health care system 4
Unfortunately, the health care system reacts like a balloon when
squeezed by piecemeal reform: other areas of the system expand to
compensate for the squeeze, and thus, nothing is saved or ultimately
corrected.5 This "cost shifting" is a prevalent phenomenon that acer-
bates problems and inequities in the American health care system. 6
Thus piecemeal reform usually results in a policy that is "penny wise
and pound foolish." 7
* Member of the Class of 1996. D.D.S. University of Southern California, 1987.
1. Clinton's Health Plan: Excerpts from Final Draft of Health Care Overhaul Propo-
sal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at 8.
2. Edwin Chen & Robert A. Rosenblatt, Clinton Promises Sweeping Coverage in
Health Care Plan, L.A. Tis.s, Sept. 11, 1993, at Al, A16.
3. The Health Care Debate. In Their Own Words; Why Health Care Fizzled Too
Little Tune and Too Much Politics, N.Y. Tams, Sept. 27, 1994, at B1l.
4. Id.
5. Steven A. Schroeder & Joel C. Cantor, On Squeezing Balloons: Cost Control Falls
Again, 325 NEw ENG. I. MED. 1099, 1099-1100 (1991).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Comprehensive health care reform is needed to correct gross in-
equities in the current system; there is, however, little agreement on
the solutions. In the past decade, U.S. health policy makers have de-
cided to focus on finding workable mechanisms to contain the rising
cost of health care before addressing the issue of universal access to
health care.8 However, some commentators argue that the cost of
health care will be contained once universal coverage is achieved.9
While the debate goes on, many Americans go without needed health
care because Congress is incapable of pursuing comprehensive health
care reform and the states are blocked by the federal government in
their reform attempts.
Interest groups, such as health care providers and insurers, vigor-
ously resist reform that negatively affects their interests. 10 This resist-
ance takes the form of financial contributions to important politicians
and massive advertising when health care reform issues become topics
for national debate.11 These influences render Congress incapable of
reform. 2 While opinion polls reveal that the American public
strongly supports health care reform,13 they also suggest that the pub-
lic feels relieved when no reform is enacted by Congress14 and prefers
that the states adopt their own health care reform.' The federal gov-
ernment's inability to enact comprehensive health care reform legisla-
8. Colleen M. Grogan, Deciding on Access and Levels of Care: A Comparison of
Canada, Britain, Germany, and the United States, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 213, 213
(1992).
9. William A. Glaser, Universal Health Insurance That Really Works: Foreign Les-
sons for the United States, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 695, 715 (1993).
10. Jonathan Greenberg, Give 'em Health, Harry; Harry S. Truman's Failed Health
Reforms, NEW REPuBuc, Oct. 11, 1993, at 20.
11. Forty-six million dollars were given to House and Senate members in the 19
months before health care reform finally died. Steve Goldstein, Lobbyism Axed Health
Care Reform, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1994, at A18. Opponents of health care reform
spent about $60 million on advertising. Edwin Chen, Backers of Health Care Reform Turn
Spotlight on Foes, L.A. Timmis, Sept. 23, 1994, at A15. Shannon Johnson & Depelsha R.
Thomas, Health Care Reform New Ad Campaigns Target Clinton Plan; Doctors, Insurers
to Spend Millions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 25, 1994, at A4.
12. Peter G. Gosselin, Chances Dim for Reform in Health Insurance, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 29, 1994, at 1.
13. Robert J. Blendon & Ulrike S. Szalay, The Politics of Health Care Reform: The
Public's Perspective, in REFORMING THE SYSTEM: CONTAINING HEALTH CARE COSTS IN
AN ERA OF UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 35,38-40 (Robert J. Blendon & Tacey S. Hyams, eds.,
1992).
14. Lessons in Failure: Health Reform Died for Lack of Popular Support, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRm., Sep. 28, 1994, at B6.
15. An Arizona public opinion poll found that 76% of those polled felt that Arizona
should adopt its own health care reform rather than wait for federal action. Jodie Snyder,
Health Care Not a Hot Topic, PHOENIX GAzETrE, Jan. 12, 1995, at B1.
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tion is a reflection of the issue's divisiveness-as created by highly
influential interest groups-and of the mixed messages sent by the
public.
Because of federally imposed barriers, states are also incapable of
comprehensive reform of their own health care systems.' 6 Federal
laws, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA),17 prevent states from experimenting with and implementing
comprehensive health care reform. 8 This creates a troubling dy-
namic, for while the federal government has failed to enact health
care reform, ERISA renders the states powerless to reform their own
health care systems. 9 Only Hawaii has avoided ERISA and achieved
universal health care coverage. °
In contrast to the United States, virtually every other western de-
mocracy guarantees their citizens access to health care.' Germany,
for instance, provides universal access while successfully implement-
ing cost containment mechanisms on its physicians.22 Nevertheless,
German physicians are more satisfied with their health care system
overall than their American counterparts?3 In the United States,
many people either lack health insurance altogether or have inade-
quate coverage; the cost of health care regularly rises much faster than
inflation and wages; and most physicians are unsatisfied with the
health care system. American health care reform can benefit from
lessons provided by the German model.
Following this introduction, Part II of this note examines how
Germany is able to deliver comprehensive and universal health care
to its citizens and, at the same time, implement successful cost con-
tainment systems over its physicians. Part III examines how Hawaii
16. See Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State
Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
18. GENERAL ACC. OFF., GAOIHRD-92-70, Access to Health Care! States Respond
to Growing Crises 20 (1992) [hereinafter GAO, States Respond].
19. Id
20. Id at 24.
21. Vemellia R Randall, Symposium, Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal
Ensure [Eiqualfity] of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60 BROOKLYN L
REv. 167, 171 (1994).
22. GENERAL Accr. OFF., GAO/HRD-92-9, Health Care Spending Controk The Ex-
perience of France, Germany and Japan (1992) [hereinafter GAO, Spending Control].
23. In the United States only 23% of physicians thought their health system worked
well as compared to 48% in Germany. Robert J. Blendon et al., Physician's Perspectives on
Caring for Patients in the United States, Canada, and West Germany, 328 NEw ENO. J. MED.
1011, 1012 (1993).
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successfully reformed its health care system while escaping the effects
of ERISA preemption. Part IV analyzes ERISA, its role as a barrier
to comprehensive state health care reform, and some of ERISA's per-
verse effects on the employees it purports to protect. Part V analyzes
whether our states could, considering omnipresent ER)(SA, adopt any
of the German system's features for delivering comprehensive univer-
sal health care and its system of physician cost containment. The con-
clusion offers two suggestions to solve the ERISA-state health care
reform quandary, and a third proposal, should an attempt to amend
ERISA fail.
H. THE GERMAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The German health care system is based on compulsory insur-
ance administered by numerous insurance organizations (sickness
funds) and regional medical associations.24 The government's role is
mostly passive, providing the statutory framework for the system and
stepping in only to resolve crises.25 Virtually all German citizens are
covered by health insurance, have free choice of physicians, and pay
little or no copayment at time of service.26 Total national spending on
physicians is controlled through negotiation by the sickness funds and
regional medical associations which standardize fees and determine a
fixed budget for regional physician spending.27 The regional medical
associations police their members to prevent over-utilization and
abuses of the system.'
A. Structure
1. Government's Role
In Germany, the government provides the statutory framework
for the health care system.29 The system is built on the idea of "soli-
darity": All persons should have equal access to quality health care
regardless of income, age, and health status.3 0 To that end, German
24. GENtnEiR Acct. OFF., GAO/HRD-93-103, 1993 German Health Care Reforms:
New Cost Controls Initiatives 20 (1993) [hereinafter GAO, 1993 German Reforms].
25. See John K. Iglehart, Germany's Health Care System (First of 71,o Parts), 324 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 503, 504 (1991) [hereinafter Iglehart, Germany's System 1].
26. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 20.
27. J.-Matthias Graf v.d. Schulenburg, Germany: Solidarity at a Price, 17 J. HEALTH
POL. PoL'y & L. 715, 727 (1992). GAO, Spending Control, supra note 22, at 45.
28. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 727.
29. Iglehart, Germany's System I, supra note 25, at 504.
30. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 715, 717.
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laws mandate that all persons participate in the sickness funds, and
that sickness funds provide comprehensive benefits to all members for
the same premium regardless of health, age, or economic status.31
In 1977 Germany passed the Cost Containment Act which cre-
ated a body called Concerted Action composed of representatives
from the health care system's organized stakeholders: physicians,
sickness funds, private insurers, drug manufacturers, employers, labor
unions, and state and local governments. The statute mandates that
Concerted Action meet twice each year to discuss the nation's health
care policy, set goals and guidelines for the health care system, and
issue directives to fulfill those plans.32
2. The Sickness Funds
In January 1993 there were 1241 sickness funds which covered
about ninety percent of Germany's population.33 Sickness funds are
organized by region, occupation, or employment relationship, and
cannot refuse insurance to anyone based on health status, pre-existing
conditions, or risk.' The sickness funds must cover both employee
members and their dependents.35 Members usually remain with the
same sickness fund for their entire life, although switching among
funds is common.36
According to Germany's health insurance law, called "Reichsver-
sicherungsordnung," virtually all necessary medical services are cov-
ered. 7 The sickness funds also provide benefits for sick leave,
rehabilitation treatment, maternity allowances, and burial costs.- - All
citizens have a right to join at least one sickness fund, and in most
cases it is compulsory.39 Only persons with high incomes40 have a
choice to either join a sickness fund, purchase private insurance, or
remain uncovered. 4' Leaving a sickness fund has serious conse-
31. Id.
32. GAO, Spending Contro supra note 22, at 35.
33. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 20.
34. Id at 24.
35. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 720.
36. Iglehart, Germiany's System I, supra note 25, at 506.
37. See Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 720.
38. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 25-26.
39. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 719.
40. In 1993 the income ceiling was DM 64,800 (about $41,000). GAO, 1993 German
Reforms, supra note 24, at 20.
41. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 719.
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quences: Once a member leaves, he cannot return to the statutory
sickness fund system.42
3. Private Health Insurance
About ten percent of the population is not covered by the sick-
ness funds and almost all of them purchase private health insurance.43
Because the premiums for private insurance are calculated on an actu-
arial basis, private insurance is appealing to high-income persons with
few or no children. 4 Some government employees are covered by a
special plan that pays only fifty to eighty percent of their health care
costs. These employees buy private insurance as supplemental cover-
age.45 Since private insurance plans pay health care providers about
twice the rate of the sickness funds, physicians and hospitals specially
cater to patients with private insurance.4 6 Some sickness fund mem-
bers also buy supplemental private insurance to obtain special benefits
not covered by the funds, such as a private room in a hospital or full
coverage for dentures.47
4. Financing the System
The sickness funds are financed by employee and employer con-
tributions, with some government financing for unemployed and re-
tired persons. 48 Employees pay a certain percentage of their income
to the sickness funds for health care coverage.49 In February 1993 that
percentage ranged from 8.5% to 16.5%.50 The average employee con-
tribution was 13.4% and was subject to an upper limitation.5 1 The
maximum amount an employee had to pay per month was DM 362
(about $229).52 The employer contributed an equal amount.53
Annual premiums are based on a sickness fund's estimate of how
much will be spent on its members' health care and other expenses
over the next year.54 The sickness fund then calculates members' pre-
42. Id. at 722.
43. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 22.
44. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 723.
45. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 22.
46. Id.
47. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 722.
48. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 23.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 23 n.9.
52. Id.
53. Iglehart, Germany's System I, supra note 25, at 506.
54. Id.
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miums by determining the percentage of members' income necessary
to pay the fund's estimated costs.55 The sickness funds ultimately turn
the money over to the regional medical associations, which disburse
the money according to a negotiated fee schedule.5
Retired persons remain members of their sickness fund and pay a
flat percentage premium from their pension based on the national av-
erage payroll contribution paid by workers.57 Premiums paid by re-
tired members account for only part of their care and the remaining
cost is subsidized by the active workers in the sickness fund.58 Sick-
ness funds with a disproportionate number of retired members receive
compensatory contributions from a national reserve fund set up for
that purpose.59
By law, unemployed persons remain members of the sickness
fund to which they belonged when they were employed and continue
to receive the same benefits as active employees. 60 The Federal Labor
Administration and local welfare agencies pay the premiums of the
unemployed. 61 Less than one percent of the population is not covered
by any type of health insurance; they are either the very poor and
homeless, or the very rich.62
5. Comprehensive Benefits and No Copayments
Germans have one of the most comprehensive health insurance
benefit programs in the world.63 Sickness fund benefits include ambu-
latory, dental, hospital, physiotherapeutic, maternity and preventive
care; drugs; family planning; rehabilitation; eyeglasses; and medical
appliances. 64 Cash benefits from the sickness fund include payments
for sick leave, subsidies for in-patient rehabilitation treatment, lump-
sum payments for home confinement, maternity allowances, and bur-
ial allowances. 65 Health care services are virtually free at the point of
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The retired members' premiums accounted for 40% of their care in 1989. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The Federal Labor Administration paid premiums of two-thirds of the unem-
ployed and local welfare agencies paid the premiums of those remaining. Id.
62. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 722.
63. GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 25.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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service; there is little or no copayment required in the German
system. 6
Sickness fund members have free choice of their office-based
physician, 67 and, on average, they visit frequently- almost eleven
times a year.68 Office-based physicians play the dominant role in the
German health care system.69 All patients are required to first consult
an office-based physician to receive ambulatory care, drug prescrip-
tions, medical appliances, and referrals for specialty care and hospital-
ization 70 Although a patient can see a specialist directly, it is
inconvenient to do so. 71 Patients are given only one "specialist"
voucher per quarter and it is usually held by the office-based physician
who, when making a referral, gives the patient a certificate to see a
specialist. To bypass the office-based physician, a patient must ask the
sickness fund for another voucher to give to the specialist.72
B. Cost Containment of Physician Fees
1. Physicians Paid Fee-For-Service
Office-based physicians are paid fee-for-service according to a
standardized fee schedule.73 The fee schedule sets the total amount
the physician can charge; there is no balance billing in Germany.74 In
other words, physicians must accept the fee schedule amount as pay-
ment in full and may not bill their patients for any additional amounts.
2. Negotiated Fee Schedules
Physician fees are determined by regional fee schedules that are
based on a national relative value scale (RVS).75 The RVS covers
over 2500 services, with each service assigned a certain number of
points.76 For instance, a telephone consultation with a patient is worth
80 points, a home visit 360 points, and an X-ray 360-900 points.77 The
RVS, revised infrequently, is negotiated at the national level between
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Iglehart, Germany's System I, supra note 25, at 506.
69. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 723.
70. Id.
71. Iglehart, Germany's System I, supra note 25, at 508.
72. Id.
73. GAO, Spending Contro4 supra note 22, at 41.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 727.
77. Id.
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the national association of sickness funds and the national medical
association.78
3. Fixed Budgets Effectively Limit Spending on Physicians
The monetary equivalent of a RVS point is determined regionally
in annual negotiations between the regional association of sickness
funds and the regional medical association.79 Thus, while relative val-
ues are the same throughout Germany, the actual fee of a given ser-
vice will differ among various regions. The result of these negotiations
is a fixed budget for all physician payments in a region.80 Annual in-
creases in the budget are limited, however, to the growth rate of the
sickness funds members' wages.81
Like collective bargaining in the United States, the annual negoti-
ations in Germany are conducted without any participation by federal,
state, or local governments.82 The government, however, sets the
stage for establishing spending limits. The Cost Containment Act
mandates that Concerted Action meet twice each year to reach an
agreement on limits for spending increases.83
The sickness funds turn the budgeted money over to the regional
medical associations which then pay their physician members.8s By
law, every physician who treats a sickness fund patient must join her
regional medical association. Physicians are paid on the basis of the
negotiated fee schedule and fixed budget.8 6 A physician's revenue (R)
is a function of the number of services (S) rendered, the average
number of points (P) for those services, and monetary value (V) of
one point:
R = SPV.87
V is derived from the fixed budget (B) and the sum of all points
billed by all physicians in a certain region:
V=B ZP.s
78. GAO, Spending Contro supra note 22, at 41.
79. Id.
80. See Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 727.
81. GAO, Spending Contro supra note 22, at 43.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id at 35.
84. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 727.
85. GAO, Spending Contro4 supra note 22, at 41 n.8.
86. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 727.
87. Id.
88. Id. EP means the sum of all Ps.
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According to these formulas, if the physicians in a region provide
more services than expected, the amount of money assigned each
point value will decrease.89 If they provide less services than ex-
pected, point value (V) will increase.90 Thus, the fixed budget acts as
a cap on total physicians' fees.91
The concept of a "flexible fee schedule," determined by the fixed
budget, RVS, and the total number of services, has effectively con-
trolled total national spending on physicians in Germany.92 The U.S.
General Accounting Office found that Germany's flexible fee sched-
ule reduced real spending on physicians by at least seventeen percent
between 1977 and 1987.93 The German system used for compensating
physicians employs the positive incentives of fee-for-service, but guar-
antees cost containment by ensuring that the growth of spending on
physicians is limited to the growth of wages. 94
4. Physicians Monitor Themselves to Curb System Abuse
Because physicians draw their revenues from the same zero-sum
pool, they have powerful incentives to monitor each other's practice
patterns.95 Physicians who abuse the system by over-treating patients
for financial gain proportionately lower the incomes of the other, hon-
est physicians. To counter abuses, regional medical associations hire
one disinterested person for each ten physicians to perform adminis-
trative review on payment of claims.96 Physicians are not required to
obtain third party approval for any medical procedure and all claims
are reviewed retrospectively. 97 Physicians whose practice patterns de-
viate from the norm by more than fifteen percent (i.e., about ten per-
cent of all physicians), are contacted every year to discuss their
practices with the medical association's "Economic Review" commit-
tee.98 Half of the physicians who are contacted are repeat offenders
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. GAO, Spending Contro supra note 22, at 44.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Schulenburg, supra note 27, at 728.
95. Id. at 727.
96. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Germany's Health Cart, System (Second of
Two Parts), 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1750, 1753 (1991) [hereinafter Iglehart, Germany's
System 1].
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1754; GAO, 1993 German Reforms, supra note 24, at 43.
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who, if their abusive patterns persist, are denied claim payments and
have their practice patterns publicized.99
In summary, Germany's health care system delivers cost-effec-
tive, universal health care access through mandates and cost contain-
ment mechanisms. Employers are required to financially participate
in their employees' health insurance, and the sickness funds must pro-
vide comprehensive benefits in their insurance plans. The sickness
funds must also charge all members equal premiums and cannot re-
fuse to insure anyone because of health risk. Total spending on physi-
cians is controlled by flexible fee schedules derived from negotiation.
H. HAWAII ACHIEVES SUCCESSFUL
HEALTH CARE REFORM
Passage of the 1974 Prepaid Health Care Actl) began Hawaii's
successful quest for universal health care access by requiring employ-
ers to provide mandated minimum health insurance to their employ-
ees.'0 1 Because of a special congressional exemption to ERISA,
Hawaii has been the only state so far to successfully enact and fully
implement comprehensive health care reform.'02
A. Universal Coverage Through Mandates
The Prepaid Health Care Act requires every Hawaii employer to
provide health insurance to their full-time employees. 0 3 Employees
must enroll in the insurance plan unless they have comparable cover-
age from another source.1' 4 The employee and employer share the
cost of the health plan. 0 5 The employee's contribution is the lesser of
half the premium or 1.5% of the employee's gross earnings; the em-
ployer pays the rest.-06 The employer is not required to pay for de-
pendent coverage, but if the employer provides only a state-approved
99. Iglehart, Germany's System II, supra note 96, at 1754.
100. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1993).
101. Deane Neubauer, State Modek Hawai, A Pioneer in Health System Reform,
H.ALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 31.
102. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 24.
103. Employers are not required to provide health insurance to employees who work
less than 20 hours per week, or employees that earn less than 86.67 (20 hours multiplied by
the average number of weeks per month) times the hourly minimum wage per month (less
than $334 in 1991). Id. at 25 & n.1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 25.
106. In 1990 a worker who earned the average annual wage of $23,192 would pay a
maximum of $29 per month for individual health coverage. Id.
19951
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
minimum benefits plan, the employer must pay half the cost of depen-
dent coverage.10 7 Comprehensive benefits are mandated by law.108
Current benefits include: medical, surgical, and maternity coverage;
up to 120 days of hospitalization; outpatient care; and diagnostic labo-
ratory services, X-ray, and radiotherapeutic services.109
Small businesses in Hawaii pay less for health hisurance than
small businesses in other states.' 10 Several factors contribute to these
savings. Since all employers in Hawaii are required to provide cover-
age to their employees, there are fewer uninsured people and, there-
fore, less uncompensated care with its attendant cost shifting and
cross-subsidies.'' There is also less uncompensated care because in-
surers are required to cover all employees in a group regardless of
medical condition or risk." 2 Another factor in lowering premiums for
small businesses is that insurers in Hawaii use a "community rating"' 1 3
system for calculating premiums. 1 4 Community rating generally re-
sults in smaller premiums because the determination of risk is based
on a much larger risk pool, the entire community of small businesses.
Thus, risk is spread further than in the typical "experience rating" sys-
tem used in the rest of the United States. In the "experience rating"
system, insurers determine premiums based on the risk of insuring a
much smaller pool, the number of employees in only one small busi-
ness. 1 5 Employer-provided insurance mandates and minimum bene-
fit requirements, together with community rating, have been Hawaii's
foundation in achieving affordable universal health care access.
107. Id.
108. Neubauer, supra note 102, at 32.
109. Id.
110. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 29.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Community rating defeats the irrational results caused by the experience rating
system currently used in the United States. In experience rating, the predictably healthy
population pays for coverage they probably will not need. Conversely, the segment of the
population who really needs health insurance, those with pre-existing conditions or the
chronically ill, must pay extraordinary amounts for premiums, if they can purchase any
insurance at all.
114. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 30.
115. Id. at 308 n.11.
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B. Special ERISA Exemption Makes Universal Access Possible
In Standard Oil v. Agsalud,116 Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act
was successfully challenged by the claim that ERISA preempted state
laws that mandate employers' health plans. Congress subsequently
amended ERISA to exempt the Prepaid Health Care Act from pre-
emption."17 The new language made it clear that Congress enacted a
"grandfather" clause; any amendment of the Prepaid Health Care Act
enacted after September 2, 1974, (ERISA's passage date) is pre-
empted by ERISA.18 The legislative history also indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to grant other states a similar exemption.119
ERISA now severely limits Hawaii's ability to improve its health care
system, since Hawaii cannot amend its 1974 legislation to implement
more comprehensive and effective reforms. 20
IV. ERISA
States other than Hawaii that have attempted health care reform
have been hamstrung in their efforts by ERISA.u1 Florida, 12z Massa-
chusetts,' and Oregon' 4 have enacted their own comprehensive re-
forms. However, since major parts of the resulting legislation violate
ERISA, these states have delayed implementing the reforms. ERISA
and its preemption clause'2 s have proven to be a virtually insurmount-
able, federally imposed barrier to state health care reform.1 16
A. The Statute and its Operation
1. Purpose
Congress enacted ERISA primarily to protect employees and
their pension plans from abuses by those who invest and manage the
116. Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (ND. Cal. 1977), affd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1980), affd mere., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
117. Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L No. 97-473, § 301,96 Stat. 2605,2611-12 (1983) (par-
tially codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A),(C) (1994)).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(H) (1994).
119. GEORGE J. ANNAS E AL., AmEmcAN HEALTH LAW 147 (1990).
120. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 24.
121. Id. at 81-82.
122. Id. at 47.
123. Id. at 38.
124. Id. at 39.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
126. Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA In
State Health Reform, HEALTH Atns, Spring(f) 1994, at 142-43.
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plans.127 Congress wanted uniform federal rules to enable employers
operating in several states to avoid inconsistent state law governing
pension plans.12s The act was extended, almost as an after-thought, to
cover other employee welfare plans including health insurance.2 9
The Department of Labor, charged with administering ERISA, has
heavily concentrated on promulgating regulations for pension plans
and has virtually ignored health insurance plans. 30 Thus, there is no
federal regulation concerning employees' health plans and the states
are preempted from regulating such plans for the b rnefit of their
residents.' 3 '
2. ERISA's Preemption Clause
A three-part analysis determines whether ERISA preempts state
law.' 32
a. Relates To
ERISA's preemption clause states that all state laws that "relate
to any employee benefit plan" are preempted. 133 The courts have in-
terpreted this "relate to" language broadly. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that state law, including its common law, relates to an em-
ployee benefit plan if it has any impact on such a plan.'' 4 In Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, Dedeaux received disability benefits pursuant to
an employee plan and the employer terminated hds benefits.1 3 5
Dedeaux sued on claims of tortious breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty because of improper handling of his benefits. 136 The
Court held that the intent of ERISA was to displace all state law
which relates to employee benefit plans and that Dedeaux's only rem-
edy must come under ERISA. 37
The U.S. Supreme Court recently narrowed the definition of "re-
late to" as it is applied to state regulation of hospital rates. 3 s In New
127. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 20.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 126, at 144.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1994). Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 126, at 144.
130. Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 127, at 144.
131. GAO, States Respond, supra note 18, at 20.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
134. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
135. lIa at 41.
136. Id
137. Id.
138. New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
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York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins., the Court held that New
York's rate-setting regulation,13 9 which included discriminatory hospi-
tal sur-charges of up to twenty-four percent in order to contain hospi-
tal costs, increase availability of health insurance, and promote Blue
Cross plans, was not a state law that "relates to" an employee benefit
plan, and thus was not preempted by ERISA.'4 ° Although the
surcharges had a substantial indirect effect by raising the costs of ER-
ISA plans, the Court stated that Congress' objective in granting ER-
ISA preemption status to state law was to guarantee uniform
administration of employee benefit plans and not necessarily the
"cost-uniformity" of such plans. 41
Significantly, the Court recognized that general health care regu-
lation is a matter of local concern,142 thus allowing many schemes of
regulation to survive ERISA preemption, such as quality standards
and workplace regulation in hospitals, 43 as well as basic systems of
hospital rate-setting.'" However, the Court also stated that a state
still cannot require an ERISA benefit plan to offer health coverage or
minimum benefits for employees, even through indirect regulation. 45
The decision suggests that a state law does not "relate to" an ERISA
health benefit plan, and thus becomes subject to preemption, as long
as the state law does not refer to ERISA plans, impose substantive
mandates on such plans, or affect the administration of those plans. 146
b. Savings Clause
ERISA has a "savings clause" which saves from preemption some
state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. ERISA provides that
any state law which "regulates insurance, banking, or securities" is ex-
empt from preemption. 47 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a
state can mandate that certain benefits be included in commercial
health insurance plans sold in the state even if employee benefit plans
purchase such insurance."4 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, Massachusetts passed a law mandating mental illness benefits
139. Ld. at 1673-74.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1680.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1681.
146. Id. at 1677-78.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
148. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-29 (1934).
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in an attempt to control the costs of health insurance by spreading risk
to more insureds.'49 Some employee benefit plans in Massachusetts
purchased commercial health insurance pursuant to collective bar-
gaining agreements. 5 0 Although a state law mandating specific health
benefits clearly relates to an employee benefit plan and is subject to
ERISA preemption, the Court held that if state law regulates a partic-
ular practice of the "business of insurance," the law is saved from pre-
emption by the savings clause.' 51 A particular practice relates to the
"business of insurance" when: (1) the practice has the effect of trans-
ferring or spreading a policyholder's risk, (2) the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,
and (3) the practice is limited to entities within the insurance indus-
try.'52 The state law in Metropolitan Life regulated the spreading of
risk of mental illness costs, involved no one other than t:he insurer and
insured, and was limited to regulating commercial health insurance
policies. 53  Thus, the Massachusetts law was saved from
preemption. 54
Many employers, including small and medium-sized firms, are
buying traditional health insurance less frequently and are turning to
self-insurance to escape state regulation.1 55 Since a fihm that self-in-
sures does not carry on the "business of insurance," its; health plan is
not subject to state laws that are saved from ERISA's preemption.156
ERISA explicitly provides for this in its "deemer clause."
c. Deemer Clause
The "deemer clause" prevents a state from "deeming" an em-
ployee benefit plan as an insurance plan subject to state regulation.157
In Metropolitan Life, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Massa-
chusetts could not mandate self-insured plans to provide mental ill-
ness benefits.'5 8 An employee benefit plan does not engage in the
business of insurance because the plan does not transfer or spread risk
149. Id.; Mass. Gen. L., ch. 175, § 47B (1993).
150. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
151. Id. at 739-47.
152. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
153. Id. at 743.
154. Id. at 744.
155. E. Felsenthal, Health Plans Are Self-Insured by More Firms, WALL ST. 1., Novem-
ber 11, 1992, at B1.
156. Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 127, at 145.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
158. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
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across a pool larger than the plan itself.15 9 Therefore, self-insured em-
ployee benefit plans escape all state regulation and are subject to vir-
tually no federal regulation. 160 This situation has led to abusive
practices by employers and their employee benefit plans.
B. The Perverse Effects of ERISA
The three-part analysis of ERISA's preemption clause provides
the opportunity for employers to self-insure and avoid virtually all
regulation of their employee health plans. This "regulatory vacuum"
allows employers and administrators of benefit plans to act in ways
inconsistent with ERISA's original purpose of protecting
employees. 61
1. McGann v. H&H Music Co.
In December 1987 McGann discovered he was afflicted with ac-
quired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).'62 Shortly thereafter he
submitted his first claim for reimbursement under H&H Music's
group health plan, which provided lifetime benefits of up to
$1,000,000.163 After learning of McGann's illness, H&H Music an-
nounced in July 1988 that it was self-insuring and changing its group
health plan to include a $5,000 lifetime maximum benefit for AIDS
and related conditions." McGann's subsequent suit claimed that
H&H Music had violated one of its few requirements under ERISA 165
by discriminating against him his right under the health plan.16 The
court held that H&H Music had an absolute right to unilaterally
change its health plan and that it did not discriminate against McGann
because, while McGann was the only employee with AIDS, the
changes in the plan applied to all employees covered by the plan.167
2. Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc.
T'mgey was employed by Pixley whose employee manual stated
that employees would be fired only for cause and that before firing,
159. Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 127, at 145.
160. Id at 146.
161. Id. at 152.
162. McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub
nom. Greenberg v. H&H Music Co., 113 S.CL 482 (1992).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
166. McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
167. Id at 408.
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progressive discipline including probation would be given. 68 Tmgey
and his family were covered by Pixley's employee health plan which
provided that "if you leave your job, you will be given an opportunity
to continue Blue Cross and Blue Shield coverage on a direct payment
basis."'1 69 In August 1985 Tingey's son was born with spina bifida, a
serious neurological birth defect.170 In November 1985 Blue Cross re-
ceived Tingey's claim for $18,000 to cover the son's delivery and post-
natal costs.' 7 1 The next day Pixley fired Tingey with no explanation
and Blue Cross refused to continue coverage. 72 Tingey sued Pixley
under ten state claims including breach of contract, torlious breach of
covenant of good faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
insurance bad faith.173 The court held that, even though Pixley fired
Tingey solely to avoid paying future benefits, all of "ingey's claims
were preempted pursuant to the Supreme Court's expansive interpre-
tation of ERISA preemption in Pilot Life.'74
3. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.
In 1989 Mrs. Corcoran was pregnant and Dr. Collins, her physi-
cian, recommended complete bed rest for the final months of preg-
nancy.' 75 As Mrs. Corcoran neared her delivery date, Dr. Collins
ordered her hospitalized so he could monitor the fetus around the
clock.176 This was the same course of action Dr. Collins had ordered
during Mrs. Corcoran's 1988 pregnancy.177 In that pregnancy, Dr.
Collins intervened and performed a successful Caesarean section in
the thirty-sixth week when the fetus went into distress. 7"
Mrs. Corcoran was a member of her employer's health plan
which required United Healthcare to conduct a utilization review
before any hospitalization.179 Utilization review is a cost containment
practice that prospectively determines whether a particular course of
action is necessary and appropriate for a member's condition (i.e., a
168. Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1992).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1128.
174. Id. at 1130-31.
175. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
176. Id. at 1322-23.
177. Id. at 1323-24 n.1.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1323.
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second opinion by the health plan).18 0 If a health plan member
forgoes utilization review and enters a hospital or enters against the
decision of utilization review, the member pays a stiff penalty.181 De-
spite Dr. Collins recommendation, United determined that hospitali-
zation was not necessary for Mrs. Corcoran.' a Two weeks later, the
fetus went into distress and died. 83
Mrs. Corcoran sued for wrongful death because of United's al-
leged negligence.'81 She claimed that United made a negligent medi-
cal decision resulting in her child's death.18s United's defense was
that, pursuant to Pilot Life, ERISA preempted Mrs. Corcoran's state
tort claim because United merely made a health benefits determina-
tion; there was no medical decision.186 The court took the middle
road and found that United made a medical decision incident to bene-
fit determinations.'87 The court held that even if United committed
medical malpractice, ERISA preempted Mrs. Corcoran's state tort
claim, because of the impact it would have on United's administration
of an employee benefit plan.'88 Although there is no remedy under
ERISA for medical malpractice in connection with benefit determina-
tions, "the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption
analysis."' 8 9 The court noted the ironic result by stating that "our in-
terpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within
a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit
plans." 9° Thus, employers and utilization review providers are im-
mune from negligent decision-making that involves the health and
lives of benefit plan members.' 9'
ERISA creates a regulatory vacuum for employers and their ben-
efit plans. States are unable to reform their health care systems by
requiring employers to participate in employee health plans or by
mandating certain health benefits in all plans. States are also unable
to protect their residents from abusive practices by benefit plans.
180. Id.
181. The penalty is a reduction of benefits by 20 percent until the increased out-of-
pocket limit is reached. Id at 1323.
182. Id. at 1324.
183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id at 1330.
186. Id. at 1329-30.
187. Id. at 1331.
188. Id. at 1333.
189. Id (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989)).
190. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333.
191. Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 127, at 152.
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Comprehensive health care reform would prevent recurrence of sto-
ries like those of McGann, T'mgey, and Corcoran.
V. CAN A STATE ADOPT GERMAN MECHANISMS?
Since the federal government has failed to enact comprehensive
health care reform, the states should be given the opportunity to do
so. Germany has proven that universal health care access coupled
with cost containment is possible. States should use the German sys-
tem as a model to comprehensively reform their health care systems.
Although the entire German system may not be appropriate for
states' practical use, its basic concepts and elements could be ex-
ploited to achieve cost-effective universal access, including: employer-
mandated participation, defined minimum health benefits, community
rating coupled with non-exclusionary insurance practices, and negoti-
ated fixed budgets for cost containment.
A. German-Style Health Care Reform Could Succeed Politically
Commentators argue that a German-style health care system re-
form is probably the most politically feasible comprehensive reform
suggested thus far.19 The U.S. social security system was originally
adapted from a German social insurance model, and, more impor-
tantly, the German system provides strong, positive roles for the ma-
jor players in the current American health care system.193 By setting
up a Concerted Action group, government would give all the major
players a voice in the running of the health care system. 194
1. Physicians' Autonomy Ensured
By participating in Concerted Action and negotiating their fees,
physicians would be better able to determine their future.' One dis-
turbing trend facing American physicians is that third-party payers
have increasingly intrusive roles in patients' treatment by second-
guessing treatment and refusing to approve payments in the name of
cost containment. This trend has led to an alarming loss of clinical
autonomy for physicians.196 With a negotiated fixed budget and the
resulting flexible fee-for-service system, there would be no need for
192. See, ag. Glaser, supra note 9, at 701, 717-18.
193. Id at 701-02.
194. Id. at 714.
195. I& at 709.
196. Gordon D. Schiff et al., A Better-Quality Alternative: Single-Payer National Health
System Reform, 272 JAMA 803, 805 (1994).
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third party micro-management of physicians' practices, with the ex-
ception of physician-initiated, revenue-protecting "economic reviews"
similar to those in the German system.
2. Insurers Maintain a Prominent Role
Some suggested health care reforms, such as those based on the
Canadian single-payer model, exclude insurers altogether. This is a
political impossibility in the United States.197 In a German-style sys-
tem, insurers play a prominent role much like their current role in the
U.S health care system. They would compete for members, collect
premiums, negotiate provider fees, and implement cost containment
policies. 9' Only a few important regulations would be imposed on
insurers: They would have to provide defined and guaranteed mini-
mum benefits, and all persons must be accepted with no medical un-
derwriting or extra premiums.
3. Policy Setting Role for Government
Once the statutory framework is in place, the government would
act as referee and step in only when identified social needs were not
being met."9 The major role of government would be to establish
broad national health policy to give guidance to the real administra-
tors of the health care system. By allowing stakeholders to administer
the health care system through Concerted Action, there would be less
governmental interference (usually influenced by self-serving interest
groups) in the working details of the system.
4. Universal Coverage for All Citizens
In a German-style reform, patients will have free choice of their
primary physician. By staying with the same primary physician, there
will be more consistency and continuity in the treatment of patients,
leading to more efficient and cost-effective preventive care. 00 Since
all citizens would be covered by insurance, which pays the same fees
across the board, there would be no cost shifting brought about by
uncompensated or discounted care. There would no longer be ration-
ing of health care based on income, health or employment status as
197. Glaser, supra note 9, at 701.
198. ld. at 708-09.
199. Id. at 703-04.
200. Schiff, supra note 196, at 804.
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found in the United States today. Americans would no longer be de-
nied health care because they cannot afford it.
B. ERISA Prevents States from Adopting a German Style System
Because of the U.S. Supreme Court's broad interpretation of ER-
ISA's preemption clause, states have no opportunity to enact compre-
hensive health care reform of any kind. Hawaii, the only state to
escape ERISA preemption, is also the only state to have enacted com-
prehensive reform to ensure universal health care for its residents.
ERISA has proven to be an insurmountable barrier to state health
care reform, and will block any state's attempt to borrow most fea-
tures of Germany's successful and cost-effective health care system.
1. Mandates
a. Employer Mandates
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Standard Oil"' states that ERISA
preempts all state laws that require employers to provide any em-
ployee benefit plan. The U.S. Supreme Court in District of Columbia
v. Greater Washington Board of Trade2°2 likewise held that a law re-
quiring employers to provide health care benefits "related to" an em-
ployee benefit plan and thus was preempted by ERISA.20 3 This
reasoning prevents states from adopting a German-style mandate re-
quiring employers to participate in purchasing their employees' health
insurance.
b. Minimum Benefits Mandated
Pursuant to Metropolitan Life,204 ERISA preempts all state laws
mandating terms of employee benefit plans provided by self-insured
employers. The only health plans that a state can regulate are those
offered by commercial insurance companies. The problem is that em-
ployers, large and small, are turning away from traditional health in-
surance policies and are self-insuring because they find it a cheaper
and more comfortable alternative in the regulatory vacuum created by
ERISA's preemption clause. Therefore, any state reform requiring
minimum health insurance benefits would have very tittle effect.
201. Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
202. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of rade, 113 S.Ct. 580 (1992).
203. Id at 584.
204. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
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2. Cost Containment
a Community Rating
The holding of Metropolitan Life0 s permits states to require
health insurers, but not self-insured plans, to adopt a community rat-
ing system for calculating premiums. Employee benefit plans can, be-
cause of ERISA's deemer clause, opt out of any state insurance
reform scheme by self-insuring. When self-insured plans remove their
generally healthy members from a community risk pool, the cost of
health insurance for the rest of the population rises. This is because
there are relatively fewer healthy persons in the pool to effectively
spread risk. Allowing many healthy members to leave a community
risk pool defeats the purpose of community rating: to spread the costs
of a community's health care across an entire population, thereby pro-
tecting everybody for the same price. Any state law requiring com-
munity rating for health insurance would have a very limited effect if
most employee benefit plans could avoid the law by self-insuring.
b. Flexible Fee Schedule Derived From Negotiation
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York Blue Cross
Plans v. Travelers Ins.2° will likely permit states to avoid ERISA in
adopting a German-style negotiated flexible fee schedule for health
care providers. The fee schedules would apply to all payers in the
state and would not specifically refer to or affect the uniform adminis-
tration of employee benefit plans. Like the rate-setting regulations in
New York Blue Cross, negotiated fee schedules would only indirectly
affect the cost of employee health plans, which is a permissible exer-
cise of the states' historic power to generally regulate health care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Germany has soundly demonstrated that a health care system can
control the costs of its physicians while delivering universal health
care access to its citizens. Germany does this by mandating employers
to contribute to their employees' sickness fund while requiring the
sickness funds to offer comprehensive health care benefits. Germany
also employs a community rating system to equalize health insurance
premiums and limits spending on physicians by negotiating fixed
budgets with them. The German system provides a model-with ef-
205. Idt at 744.
206. New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
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fectively functioning mechanisms-that a state could adapt for its own
comprehensive health care reform.
Hawaii is the only one of the fifty states to have achieved univer-
sal health care access, and is also the only state with aa ERISA ex-
emption. The exemption allows it to mandate all employers in the
state to provide certain minimum health benefits to employees. Ha-
waii also uses a community rating system to equalize health insurance
premiums among its residents.
In the United States, the federal government has failed to reform
the national health care system to ensure universal access. Reform is
also unlikely in the near future. Thus, the states should be given the
ability to exploit proven methods, such as mandating that all employ-
ers subsidize employee health plans, requiring certain minimum
health benefits in those plans, utilizing community rating to determine
premiums across the state, and negotiating fixed budgets to contain
health care costs, to ensure its residents universal access to health
care. ERISA is the states' major roadblock to health care reform.
The states have been called "laborator[ies]" for "social and eco-
nomic experiments."2 °0 ERISA makes a state's ability to experiment
with health care reform virtually impossible. Accordingly, some kind
of amendment to ERISA is required before any state wil be able to
tackle comprehensive health care reform. This note offers two pos-
sibilities, and a third proposal should an attempt to amend ERISA
fail.
(1) Make ERISA exemption readily available to states. Hawaii
has delivered a successful universal health care system which would
not have been possible without an ERISA exemption. Until Congress
can enact its own comprehensive health care reform, it should freely
grant Hawaii-like ERISA exemptions to other states with workable,
cost-effective health care reform plans.
(2) Eliminate ERISA's jurisdiction over employee health plans.
So far, Congress and the Department of Labor have inadequately reg-
ulated employee health plans. The states have a great interest in pro-
tecting their residents' health. States have traditionally regulated the
insurance industry, including health insurance. Requiring interstate
employers to provide health benefits to their employees according to
state regulation is very different, and more easily accomplished, than
forcing employers to deal with inconsistent state laws concerning vest-
ing and long-term administration of pension plans.
207. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 18:745
Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption
(3) If Congress fails to enact health care reform and also refuses
to amend ERISA preemption, rules must be instituted to avoid the
perverse results of cases like McGann, Tingey, and Corcoran. The
states have significant interests in protecting their residents. When
federal law preempts state-based remedies and also provides no signif-
icant alternative federal remedy, the state, as a welfare provider of last
resort, can be left with the expense of providing health care to victims
of abusive practices by employee benefit plans. Regulations regarding
health benefit plans such as guaranteed minimum health benefits, a
requirement to offer unlimited continuation coverage when an em-
ployee leaves the company, and accountability for substandard utiliza-
tion review decisions should be promulgated under ERISA. Congress
took a step in the right direction, albeit a small one, when it amended
ERISA and required employers to offer limited continuation health
coverage (eighteen to thirty-six months) to certain employees who
would otherwise lose their benefits.20
While ERISA's preemption clause is a "crowning achievement"
to some,209 the regulatory vacuum it creates has led to the perverse
consequences suffered by McGann, Tmgey, and Corcoran. Pension
plans only involve money, while employee welfare plans protect life
and health. It is incredible that so much regulation is promulgated for
the protection of money and yet there is virtually no protection of a
health plan member's access to health care-at times, a priceless
commodity.
The final question is: Should ERISA continue to preempt states'
attempts to reform their health care systems? To answer that ques-
tion, one must ask whether the benefits of uniform regulation to em-
ployers outweigh the benefits to the states of universal health care
access. This note answers no.
208. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-67 (1994).
209. 120 Cong. Rec. 19,197 (1974) (Statement of Rep. John Dent), cited in Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983).
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